Tunisian Academy of Sciences,
Letters and Arts *Beït al-Hikma*
Departement of Islamic studies

INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM

The Nine-Hundredth Anniversary of Ibn Rushd

IBN RUSHD

(520H/1126AD - 595H/1198AD)

Questions & Approaches

December 3 & 4, 2026 at 9:00 a.m

at the Palace of the Tunisian Academy

Beït al-Hikma

Prepared by

Mokdad Arfa Mensia

Abstracts

PRESENTATION WORD

For over a quarter of a century, universities and research centers worldwide have commemorated the 800th anniversary of the death of the great philosopher and Qadi of Córdoba, Ibn Rushd (Averroes), by holding countless scholarly gatherings, publishing studies, and issuing editions of texts. These efforts have contributed significantly to shedding light on essential aspects of the Cordoban philosopher's personality, writings, thought, and enduring influence. The Tunisian Academy of Sciences, Letters, and Arts *Beït al-Hikma* made a significant contribution to this commemoration by organizing a major international symposium in collaboration with the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALECSO). The proceedings were published in Tunis in 1999 and sparked keen international interest.

The year 2026 marks the nine-hundredth anniversary of the philosopher's birth. To celebrate this occasion, the Academy will host a high-level gathering bringing together a number of internationally renowned scholars. They will discuss various issues concerning Ibn Rushd: his era; the diverse aspects of his philosophical, scientific, and religious thought; his place in human thought; and his enduring influence in both the East and the West.

The discussion will focus on several key themes:

1- Physics and Metaphysics.

2- Politics and Ethics.

3- Philosophy and religion, reason and revelation.

4- Philosophy, theology and jurisprudence in Society.

5- Latin Averroism.

6- Approaches to Ibn Rushd.

ABSTRACTS

I- PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS

* **Josep Puig MONTADA,** (Instituto Universitario de Ciencias de las Religiones, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain), puigmont@filol.ucm.es

The Natural Questions of The Incoherence of the Incoherence, their historical relevance

The presenter completed the Catalan translation of the last four questions –XVII though XX-- of Averroes' *The Incoherence of* "the Incoherence" for the University of Barcelona Press. The process of translating and annotating the text led him to reflect on the importance of these questions, which resulted in this presentation.

Averroes wrote a refutation of Al-Ghazālī's book *The Incoherence of the Philosophers* in which he gathered the last four questions under the title "About the natural sciences", maybe be better translated as "About the natural things." However, Al-Ghazālī devoted the XVII question to denying causality using arguments reminiscent of Sceptic criticism.

Questions XVIII-XIX are about the nature of the human soul and Al-Ghazālī considers that the philosophers, i.e., Avicenna, cannot prove that the soul is a self-subsisting substance. He argues that the hypothesis is unsustainable because its receptacle should become indivisible and Averroes has to show that his argument is flawed.

Question XX, the last one, is about the afterlife as outlined by the Koran. Al-Ghazālī believed that the afterlife was the essence of Islam, and proving its existence justified refuting philosophical doctrines, including the doctrine of causal connection.

Averroes had no difficulty rejecting Al-Ghazali's denial of causality. Regarding the final question about the afterlife as described in the Quran, the presenter believes that Averroes was afraid to engage in the discussion and he chose to defend the practical need for religion, particularly Islam. And it is obvious that the topics discussed in these questions have not lost their relevance through history.

* **Cristina CERAMI,** (Directrice de Recherche, CNRS, SPHERE, Directrice du centre CHSPAM (Centre d'Histoire des Sciences et des Philosophies Arabes et Médiévales)
cristinacerami@hotmail.com
http://www.sphere.univ-paris-diderot.fr/spip.php?article489

Le cerveau au service du cœur. Averroès entre Aristote et Galien

Cette communication examine la place qu'Averroès (m. 1198) accorde au cerveau dans sa réélaboration du cardiocentrisme aristotélicien à la lumière de la tradition médicale gréco-arabe, et notamment de Galien. À partir de textes issus de ses commentaires à la zoologie d'Aristote, j'analyserai la manière dont Averroès reconnaît au cerveau et aux nerfs des fonctions physiologiques spécifiques tout en maintenant la primauté du cœur comme principe de la vie et des principales facultés de l'âme. Je montrerai que cette subordination du cerveau repose sur une réélaboration de la téléologie aristotélicienne : Averroès attribue au cerveau et aux nerfs le statut de parties qui existent non parce qu'elles sont absolument nécessaires à la vie, mais « en vue du meilleur ». Il peut ainsi intégrer les acquis de l'anatomie galénique sans renoncer au modèle cardiocentrique aristotélicien.

* **Abdeljalil BEN SALIM,** (Institute of the Fundamentals of Religion (*Uṣūl al-Dīn*), Zaytūna University, Tunisia; Tunisian Academy of Sciences, Letters, and Arts, Carthage, Tunisia)
abdeljalilsalem2015@gmail.com

The Eternity of the World according to Ibn Rushd

It appears that the concept of eternity—as understood by Greek philosophers, particularly Plato and Aristotle—was subject to significant confusion in its representation by Muslim theologians (*Mutakallimūn*). Plato was variously attributed with holding views of both temporal origination (*ḥudūth*) and eternity (*qidam*), whereas Aristotle was generally associated with the doctrine of eternity. This concept famously sparked intense theological and philosophical debate among Muslim thinkers. Later scholars subsequently attempted to approach the issue with greater objectivity. In addressing this matter, Ibn Rushd seems to have employed a degree of flexible hermeneutics. Did he maintain a consistent perspective across his various works? Or did his stance shift between his commentaries on Aristotle and his treatises—such

as *al-Faṣl, al-Tahāfut, and al-Kashf*? This paper seeks to address this problematic issue.

* **Romdhan BEN MANSOUR,** (Higher Institute of Human Sciences of Tunis, Tunis El Manar University, Tunisia)
Benmansourromdhan@yahoo.fr

The Problematic Nature of Demonstrating the Principles of Sensible Substance in Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd

Ibn Rushd's *Great Commentary on the Metaphysics* represents the meeting point of two approaches to the study of substance: one physical and the other metaphysical (Commentary 5, p. 1420, Bouyges edition).

Aristotle's commentators—both Hellenistic and Arab—found the question of the relationship between sensible substance and the two sciences of physics and metaphysics to be problematic: which of the two is better suited to explain the principles of natural beings?

Given the ambiguity of Aristotle's statements and his characteristic conciseness—and knowing that Ibn Rushd had access to several Arabic translations of *Book Lambda*—he found himself confronted with interpretations by other commentators (including Ibn Sīnā) that he deemed inconsistent with the Master's teachings. He therefore sought to correct this by invoking the interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias.

How did the *Great Commentator* correct the views of *al-Shaykh al-Ra'īs*? How might the multiplicity of translations have influenced the way Ibn Rushd ranked these interpretations? Why did he resort to logic to correct Ibn Sīnā's interpretation? And what differences exist in the various applications of logical methods to the study of the physical realm?

* **Richard TAYLOR,** (Department of Philosophy, Marquette University, USA; Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium)
Richard.Taylor@Marquette.edu / richard.taylor@hiw.kuleuven.be / richard.taylor@kuleuven.be
http://richardctaylor.info/richard-c-taylor/
CV

Divine Knowledge and the Conciliation of Philosophy and Religion

This paper presents an account of Divine Knowledge in the thought of Ibn Rushd that allows for the true conciliation of philosophy and religion in a single worldview or Weltanschauung founded on philosophical metaphysics and largely — albeit not fully — compatible with traditional understandings of Islamic religious teachings.

II- POLITICS AND ETHICS

* **Charles BUTTERWORH,** (Department of Government & Politics, University of Maryland, USA)
cebworth@umd.edu

Poetical modes and political character, Averroes on Arabic poetry

In his Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics (Butterworth, 1986 and 2000), a work in which he displays an admirable familiarity with Arabic poetry, Averroes harshly criticizes its pre-Islamic mode. For him, the vices of such poetry are such as to deprive those associated with it from being considered a natural people. The charge is strange and deserves careful attention. In this presentation, I propose to explain why Averroes -- himself an Arab -- would make such a judgment and what it means for political character.

References

Butterworth, 2000: *Averroes' Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics*, English translation with introduction (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2000.

Butterworth, 1986: *Averroes' Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics* (*Talkhīṣ Kitāb al-Shi῾r*), with Ahmad Haridi, critical edition of Arabic text with introduction and notes (Cairo: General Egyptian Book Organization, 1986).

* **Farid LAALIBI,** (Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Sfax, Tunisia)
efaridalibi@yahoo.fr

The Question of Ethics in Ibn Rushd

In examining the question of ethics in Ibn Rushd's work, our aim is to answer a question: Did Ibn Rushd possess an ethical philosophy? He did not dedicate a specific treatise to ethics that could serve as a foundational basis for an answer—an undeniable dilemma. Yet, is this not the same dilemma we faced regarding his political philosophy? We previously concluded that he held a political vision—derived not only from his *Commentary of Plato's* Republic, but also from an examination of his entire corpus. Can we reach the same conclusion by following the same path—relying primarily on his *Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics*,

recently restored to Arabic through Ahmed Shahlan's translation from the Hebrew? Or must we venture down different paths?

A survey of the Rushdian corpus reveals a wealth of concepts—such as *ʿadl* (justice), *ʿadāla* (equity), *saʿāda* (happiness), *faḍīla* (virtue), *shajāʿa* (courage), *ṣadāqa* (friendship), *ʿiffa* (chastity), etc. This allows us to examine them in terms of their moral significance and in relation to our central question, with the hope of linking the study of Abū al-Walīd's political thought to the study of his ethical philosophy.

Taoufik BEN AMEUR, (Faculty of Human and Social Sciences, University of Tunis, Tunisia; Tunisian Academy of Sciences, Letters, and Arts, Carthage, Tunisia)
taoufikbenameur@yahoo.fr

Ibn Rushd's Doctrine on the Meaning of Free Will

This paper examines the question of free will from the perspective of the philosopher Ibn Rushd, drawing upon the philosophical and religious discourse found in his works—specifically *Manāhij al-Adilla, Faṣl al-Maqal, and Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*. To this end, the author begins by outlining the various responses to this issue within the Islamic culture of Ibn Rushd's time, thereby clarifying the intellectual and cultural contexts in which the philosopher from Córdoba addressed the subject. The paper analyzes the methodology Ibn Rushd employed, comparing it with the approaches of his predecessors and contemporaries—both Muslim philosophers and theologians. Ultimately, this analysis sheds light on Ibn Rushd's significant contributions to Islamic philosophical thought, as well as to human thought in a universal sense.

III- PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION, REASON AND REVELATION

Feriel BOUHAFA, (Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg, Faculty of Human Science at Würzbur, Germany)
feriel.bouhafa@uni-wuerzburg.de

Heirs of Prophets: Ibn Rushd on the Moral Responsibility of Philosophers

Despite Ibn Rushd's clear affirmation that metaphysics is the noblest form of worship of God (*sharīʿat al-falāsifa*), the moral foundation of his theoretical philosophy has long been overlooked partly due to the modern scholarly focus on the divide between philosophy and sharia. However, this dichotomy is misleading as it overshadows the root of his moral project, which is embedded in a divinely ordained vision of the universe, in which the path to God through both theoretical and practical pursuit is determined by the active intellect. This reading, based on my forthcoming book, shall not only offer a new fresh perspective on how to read Ibn Rushd's philosophy but also foreground his ascription of a moral responsibility to philosophers as the heirs of prophets to fulfill the covenant of the *fiṭra* through conjunction (*ittiṣāl*). Finally, my construal shall also situate Ibn Rushd's project within his immediate intellectual context, particularly with regard to his view on other sciences, such as *kalām and taṣawwuf*, shedding new light on his legacy in the Muslim world.

Karen TALIAFERRO, (Hamilton Center, University of Florida)
krupprecht@gmail.com

Ibn Rushd, the Rationalist? Seeking the Role of Revlation (wāhy) in the Rushdian corpus

In the early 20th century, Léon Gauthier wrote that Ibn Rushd had "not for an instant ceased to remain faithful to the principles of rationalism," and that prophecy was, to him, a "purely natural," i.e., not supernatural, phenomenon.[1] While interpretation of Ibn Rushd's works has expanded greatly in the intervening century, this picture of Ibn Rushd as a rationalist, for whom religion and prophecy are necessary but ultimately less reliable guides to the truths philosophy can

best uncover, remains perhaps the preeminent one among scholars even today. In Richard Taylor's reading, for instance, "in matters of religion where religious teachings and philosophical reasoning intersect, there is one truth, not two, and the primacy of philosophy with its method of demonstration must be maintained, precisely as argued in the *Faṣl al-maqāl*." [2]

This paper argues that this view of Ibn Rushd as believing in the sufficiency of reason for knowledge is not entirely accurate. Rather, while for Ibn Rushd, philosophical demonstration may indeed be the highest form of human reasoning, it is not the only possible way of attaining knowledge. That is, revelation (*waḥy*) can contribute to, not merely rephrase, the knowledge available by reason alone. If correct, the consequences of such a reading are potentially profound: philosophy is, of course, necessary to know the truth, but not sufficient. In making this argument, I take both textual and linguistic approaches to analyzing, principally, Ibn Rushd's theological works (*Faṣl al-Maqāl, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut and al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij*), supplementing the argument with evidence from his philosophical works as well, to distinguish Ibn Rushd's own voice from those he is discussing (whether al-Ghazali or Aristotle). In so doing, we find Ibn Rushd making a nuanced, yet clear, argument for the necessity of both reason and revelation to form complete knowledge.

[1] *La Théorie d'Ibn Rochd sur les rapports de la religion et de la philosophie*, Paris, 1909, p.145-6, quoted in Badawi p. 61.)

[2] Richard Taylor, "Averroes and the Philosophical Account of Prophecy," in *Studia Graeco-Arabica* 8 (2018), 292.

IV- PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN SOCIETY

Fouad BEN AHMAD, (Dar el-Hadith El-Hassania for Higher Islamic Studies, Al-Qarawiyin University, Rabat, Morocco)
https://edhh.academia.edu/FouadBenAhmed
benahmedf@gmail.com

Ibn Rushd's Writings as a Point of Entry into the Study of Kalām in the Maghrib and al-Andalus

The writings of Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198) present a striking paradox. On the one hand, they contain a sustained critique of *kalām*, particularly in its Ashʿarite form. On the other, they contain almost no explicit references to Maghribī or Andalusī theologians or theological works. This apparent silence may suggest that Ibn Rushd was directing his criticism primarily at eastern theologians, above all Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) and Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), and that the Islamic West lacked a theological tradition sufficiently active or influential to attract sustained critical attention.

This paper takes Ibn Rushd's writings as an entry point for reassessing the place of *kalām* in the Maghrib and al-Andalus during the sixth/twelfth century. It examines the significance of the absence of local names from his works and asks whether this absence reflects a genuine weakness—or even the absence—of theological activity, or whether it is better explained by the nature of Ibn Rushd's polemical intervention. Ibn Rushd was not engaging with al-Juwaynī merely as a distant eastern authority. Rather, he was responding to particular works, above all the *Irshād* and the *Risāla Niẓāmiyya*, which had acquired an important place in doctrinal education and religious formation in the Islamic West.

The paper traces the dissemination of these works in the Maghrib and al-Andalus, as well as the ways in which they were received, taught, and reformulated within western Islamic scholarly culture. It also considers their circulation through networks of scholars and students, and their role in the educational structures through which Ashʿarite teachings and authorities were consolidated and transmitted. From this perspective, the paper examines Ibn Rushd's sustained focus on al-Juwaynī and asks

whether it points to a remote eastern authority or, rather, to texts that had acquired a real presence within the intellectual environment in which he lived.

This approach treats Ibn Rushd's writings as a source for tracing the presence of *kalām* in the Maghrib and al-Andalus, as well as the place occupied by eastern theological authorities within educational networks across these two regions. It also allows Ibn Rushd's silence concerning local theologians to be understood in relation to his critical and textual strategies, rather than being taken as decisive evidence for the absence of theological activity in his milieu.

Nejia Ourimi, (Higher Institute of Human Sciences of Tunis, University of Tunis-El Manar, Tunis; Tunisian Academy of Sciences, Letters, and Arts, Carthage, Tunisia)
nejia.ourimi@issht.utm.tn

Women in Ibn Rushd's Discourse and the Conflict of Interpretations

This paper addresses an issue that continues to fuel controversy regarding the understanding and interpretation of Ibn Rushd's discourse: the divergence between his philosophical and legal conceptions of women and their role in society. While his philosophical discourse highlighted equality between men and women—emphasizing the woman's capacity for reflection and governance, as well as her aptitude to be a philosopher, leader, and warrior—his «legal» discourse merely reproduced the status defined by the legislative heritage, which enshrined women's intellectual and religious inferiority.

Various interpretations of this duality have emerged—too many to detail here. What interests us is that they testify, first, to the particular importance Ibn Rushd's texts hold today and, second, to the persistent difficulties encountered in developing mechanisms for reading and interpretation within contemporary Arab culture. Without engaging in the conflict of interpretations by favoring one over another, this paper seeks to reveal the extent to which Ibn Rushd's discourse is capable of opening up the meanings attributed to it and allowing them to evolve in various directions. It does so by drawing on textual and contextual approaches—facilitated by discourse analysis—that stem from the issues raised by the following guiding questions: Is there a relationship,

whether apparent or hidden, between Ibn Rushd's philosophical and legal discourses on women? What place does his conception of women occupy within his broader philosophical vision of «justice in the ideal city»? Finally, to what extent might this Averroist duality reflect an epistemological impasse: the inability of medieval Islamic thought to conceive a mechanism enabling rational philosophy to help shape reality?

Amor BEN HAMMADI, (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Manouba, University of Manouba, Tunisia)
amorbenhammadi1@gmail.com

On a Fatwa Attributed to Abū al-Walīd Ibn Rushd (the Grandson)

This study examines a *fatwa* concerning a Christian convert to Islam. Numerous objects associated with Christianity were discovered in his possession and used to accuse him of apostasy. Given the gravity of the case—which carried a potential death penalty—Ibn Rushd was consulted and issued a *fatwa* on the matter.

Several researchers have analyzed this case and Ibn Rushd's response in various studies, drawing numerous conclusions based on the mistaken belief that the Ibn Rushd in question was the grandson, when in fact he was the grandfather. This is supported by indisputable «material» evidence, rendering certain previous conclusions invalid.

This *fatwa* raises numerous questions. The present research focuses on one of them: demonstrating that it would have been impossible for Ibn Rushd (the grandson) to issue such a fatwa, given the characteristics of the Almohad jurisprudence he followed.

V- AVERROES LATINUS

Pilar HERRÁIZ OLIVA, (Department of Philosophy, University of Murcia, Spain; Istanbul Medeniyet University, Turkey)
piliherraiz@gmail.com

Ontological Foundations of the Unicity Thesis and the Problem of Individual Knowledge in Averroes Latinus: A new approach

Averroes' unicity thesis, that is, the thesis that there is only one intellect for all human beings, is considered by a number of scholars as the most original contribution made by the Cordovan philosopher. Also known, though erroneously, as the thesis of monopsychism, this philosophical position presents some challenges, especially related to how this separate and universal substance, i.e. the intellect, is connected to individuals by means of their thoughts and thus how individual knowledge is possible.

To our understanding, this thesis has been widely misunderstood and, as a consequence, a proper terminology in order to truly account for Averroes' thought is still lacking. This is also due to the fact that when reading his words many scholars have focused on either making his thought compatible with religion or on criticising Ibn Rushd with regard to the alleged impossibility of individual knowledge. It is thus our intention, by means of this proposal, 1) to clarify what the metaphysical foundations of the unicity thesis are, i.e., what are the ontological grounds that allow for such a philosophical stance and thus to examine the nature of the intellect, and 2) to show how the very nature of the intellect relates and conditions how we understand the things that we understand, for which we will not only examine the thing as known, but also the object of knowledge and how it joins our individual thoughts. Drawing upon Averroes Latinus' Long Commentary on the De anima as our main source, we aim to show that, in fact, Ibn Rushd's approach anticipates that of Modernity.

VI- APPROACHES TO IBN RUSHD

Mokdad ARFA MENSIA, (Faculty of Human and Social Sciences, University of Tunis, Tunisia; Tunisian Academy of Sciences, Letters and Arts, Carthage, Tunisia)
mokdadarfa@hotmail.com

To be fair to Ibn Rushd by drawing inspiration from Ibn Rushd himself : Isomorphist Approach

> "This is evident to anyone who acts with justice and impartiality and considers the matter by itself" (Ibn Rushd, *Manâhij*).

This paper starts from the evolution of Averroist studies since Ernest Renan and the transformation of Ibn Rushd into a philosopher disputed by nations and whose work has sparked debates both in the West and in the East, so that it has resulted in a multiplication in the interpretation of his thought, his place in history and its scope. Many examples bear witness to this: Mahmoud Qasim from Egypt, Abdelmajid El-Ghannouchi from Tunisia and Mohammed Abid al-Jabiri from Morocco, to speak only of Arab countries.

Two occasions mark the last three decades. One was the commemoration of the eight hundredth anniversary of the death of the philosopher and judge of Cordoba. Universities and research centers around the world celebrated this event. This has led to a considerable acceleration of research in this area.

There is no doubt that the scholarly production during these two periods contributed greatly to our knowledge of Ibn Rushd.

The second opportunity presents itself to us today. We are celebrating the ninth centenary of the philosopher's birth. The author of this article wonders if this could constitute an opportunity to meditate on the fate of Ibn Rushd and his thought, and try in some way to do him justice for what he may have incurred.

The research proceeds through formal homology with the work of Ibn Rushd. It would be inspired by what seems to be the very foundation of the philosopher's work and methodology: historical distortions due to different interpretations, the return to the original speech in its content,

respect for its manifest meaning and strict fidelity to the intention of its author.

This is a form of game with Ibn Rushd, since we pretend to apply the same rules of the game that he himself established. However, it is a game that tries to be serious and aims to overcome forced interpretations, to get closer to Ibn Rushd, that of Cordoba, to do justice to this exceptional and endearing figure and to respect his aspirations.

Ultimately, it is the perpetual interplay of the claim to truth and to its royal path.

Habibollah BABAEI, (Academy of Islamic Sciences and Culture, ISCA, Islam and West Studies; University of Tehran, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, Tehran, Iran)
Habz109@gmail.com

The System of Civic Virtues and Its Civilizational Implications in Ibn Rushd's Political Thought: A Reading of Al-Ḍarūrī fī al-Siyāsa *and* Talkhīṣ al-Akhlāq

In most modern interpretations, politics is conceived as primarily oriented toward power, while ethics is viewed as concerned with individual salvation. Ibn Rushd, however, delineates within his jurisprudence and philosophy a framework wherein civic virtues serve as the driving engine, pillar, and foundational core of civilizational life—with the true Sharīʿa functioning as the instituting ground of the virtuous and just city. Accordingly, the vitality or decline of a polity is a direct function of the consolidation, structural distribution, or degeneration of virtues across the social body.

Ibn Rushd grounds the constitution of the city on four classes of virtues: theoretical virtues, deliberative/intellectual virtues, moral virtues, and practical arts. Drawing upon Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī—most notably in The Attainment of Happiness (*Taḥṣīl al-Saʿāda*)—and within the framework of his reading of Plato's *Republic*, Ibn Rushd does not define these virtues merely as abstract psychological perfections; rather, he ties them directly to concrete functions and structural roles within society.

One of the most distinctive features of Ibn Rushd's thought, setting him apart from the majority of his contemporaries, is his conceptualization of the social status of women on the basis of shared participation in virtues, while acknowledging the constitutional differences between men and women. Grounded in a common human nature, he affirms women's intrinsic capacity to attain diverse orders of virtue, thereby validating their active participation in practical affairs, productive arts, and even the guardianship and governance of the city.

In a concrete and historically grounded diagnosis—reflecting on the decline of contemporary Islamic societies in al-Andalus—Ibn Rushd demonstrates that confining women to the sphere of consumption and restricting their role solely to biological reproduction (analogous to a plant-like existence) paralyzes half of the city's productive and intellectual capacities. From his perspective, depriving women of actualizing virtues and practical arts imposes a severe burden of consumerism on the city's economy, stripping society of its civilizational balance and dynamism. Civilizational flourishing, therefore, remains inextricably linked to the universal cultivation and diffusion of civic virtues throughout all strata of society.

Hafedh ABDELMELEK, (Faculty of Sciences of Bizerte, Bizerte, University of Carthage, Tunisia ; Tunisian Academy of Sciences, Letters and Arts *Beït al-Hikma*, Carthage, Tunisia)
Hafedh.Abdelmelek@beitalhikma.tn
http://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=UV3ayJgAAAAJ

Modélisation symbolique des dynamiques civilisationnelles par l'équation d'emointelligence : interaction entre temps réel (tr) et temps imaginaire (ti) de l'averroïsme à la crise contemporaine 2026

Cette étude propose une lecture philosophique et civilisationnelle de l'évolution de la modernité occidentale à travers l'équation d'emointelligence $(I=(tr+ti)E^{\alpha}\varepsilon)$ développée par Hafedh Abdelmelek, fondée sur l'intélligence (I), les émotions (E), l'interaction dynamique entre le temps réel (tr) et le temps imaginaire (ti). Le tr représente les dimensions matérielles, scientifiques, technologiques et historiques des civilisations, tandis que le ti renvoie aux dimensions symboliques, émotionnelles, spirituelles et métaphysiques. L'analyse retrace le point d'inflexion civilisationnel initié par Averroès dans la transmission du

rationalisme aristotélicien vers l'Occident, marquant la transition progressive d'une civilisation dominée par le ti médiéval vers une expansion du tr scientifique et technologique. En parallèle, Ibn ʿArabī rappelle la dimension intérieure et symbolique du réel, où le ti demeure essentiel à la cohérence Humaine. En revanche, Marx radicalise ensuite la primauté de la matérialité historique et économique, renforçant la domination du tr, tandis que Einstein réintroduit le rôle central de l'imagination et de la relativité, montrant que la science elle-même repose sur une interaction subtile entre abstraction et réalité. Paradoxalement en 2026, le débat historique entre Al-Ghazālī et Averroès réapparaît indirectement dans les tensions contemporaines (Burn-out civilisationnel) entre technologie, spiritualité, intelligence artificielle et conscience Humaine. À partir de cette grille de lecture, la situation civilisationnelle de 2026 (fatigue collective, perte du sens,…etc.) peut être interprétée comme un déséquilibre entre tr et ti, marqué par une surcharge du réel matérialisé et un affaiblissement des structures symboliques et émotionnelles. L'innovation du modèle de l'émointelligence réside dans la proposition d'un cadre transdisciplinaire d'analyse civilisationnelle, reliant philosophie, matérialisme historique, physique moderne, psychologie collective et intelligence artificielle, afin d'explorer une possible nouvelle synthèse entre raison, conscience, émotion et technologie dans les sociétés du XXI^{e} siècle.

Mots clés : Averroïsme, Equation d'émointelligence, temps réel, temps imaginaire, burn-out civilisationnel.

Ikbal LABIDI LAMMOUCHI, (Professor, Higher Institute of Human Sciences, University of Jendouba, Tunisia)
lamouchi_ikbel@yahoo.fr

Truth between unity and diversity: an analysis of interpretation mechanisms and the multiplicity of approaches in Ibn Rushd

This paper takes as its starting point a philosophical paradox: on the one hand, Ibn Rushd's adherence to the principle of the unity of truth—based on the postulate that «truth does not contradict truth»—and, on the other, the diversity of human existence, characterized by varied levels of understanding, cultures, and perspectives. It aims to reveal how the Cordoban philosopher constructed the concept of a singular truth by examining the mechanisms he employed to shield it from any apparent

contradiction. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of interpretation as an epistemological mediator, ensuring harmony between demonstration and text while preserving truth from fragmentation and contradiction.

This study attempts a re-evaluation of epistemological interpretations that have misconstrued Ibn Rushd's project—specifically those attributing to him a doctrine of dual truth, positing the existence of a religious truth alongside a rational truth. In this light, the research addresses the following question: how did Ibn Rushd manage the politics of truth within the «city of religion» so as to preserve its unity, while simultaneously organizing the methods of its production and dissemination across different levels of discourse?

Within this framework, the central inquiry shifts from the quest for truth to an examination of the epistemological and discursive conditions that render truth possible and accessible within the "city of religion".

Abdessattar RAJAB, (Higher Institute for Childhood Professionals, Carthage, University of Carthage, Tunisia)
rejebabdessatar@gmail.com

Who Guards the Truth?
Legitimacy and Inequality of Intellectual Destinies in Almohad Andalusia: A Socio-Anthropological Approach

This article examines the social and political conditions that determine the place of philosophical discourse within the Islamic tradition and its relationship to the production of truth and legitimacy, as well as to the distribution of interpretive authority. It adopts a socio-anthropological perspective.

The study tests the hypothesis that the varying fates of intellectual discourses in the Almohad sphere cannot be explained solely by their doctrinal and epistemological content, but also by the position of their producers, the relationship of each discourse to the structure of political legitimacy, and its capacity to redefine who holds the right to interpret texts and define accepted truth. It draws upon Talal Asad's concept of «discursive tradition.»

Methodologically, this article employs a historical-comparative analysis of discourse, taking *Faṣl al-Maqāl, Al-Kashf ʿan Manāhij al-ʾAdillah*,

and *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* as its central textual corpus and cross-referencing them with historical sources, Arabic translations, and the Latin annals of the kings of Castile. The analysis focuses on three interdependent levels: the multiplicity of centers of truth production within the Almohad sphere; the strategy employed by Ibn Rushd—acting as jurist, judge, physician, and philosopher—to negotiate the legitimacy of demonstrative reasoning within the Islamic tradition; and his ordeal, understood as a complex event involving political transformations, intellectual conflicts, and mechanisms justifying exclusion. Ibn Rushd's trajectory cannot be reduced to a simple confrontation between religion and philosophy, but rather reveals a struggle to define the boundaries of legitimate discourse and the authority required to preserve and interpret the truth—a struggle whose outcome seems far from settled.

Keywords: Almohad legitimacy; rhetorical tradition; socio-anthropology of knowledge; intellectual inequalities; intellectual exclusion; philosophical reception.

Matteo Di GIOVANNI, (Università degli Studi di Torino, Dipartimento di Filosofia e Scienze dell'Educazione)
matteo.digiovanni@unito.it

Averroes' Project: A Reappraisel

In 1996, in his exemplary assessment of Averroes' project, Gerhard Endress concluded that what Averroes intended by his practice of philosophy was to ground society upon the sole truth attained through demonstrative reason. The point was argued by presenting an impressive amount of textual evidence and a fine understanding of its significance for Averroes' own development as a Muslim scholar of Aristotle. Today, thirty years after Endress' account, the overall appreciation of Averroes' trajectory can retain much of the evidence then produced as well as its interpretation, but it requires a fresh evaluation of its philosophical assumptions and implications. First among these is Averroes' metaphysical realism, which posits an objective set of truths residing not merely in nature or experimentation, with their inherent variety and fallibility, but in one separate, eternal substance that is named Agent Intellect and universally accessible by means of conjunction. The emphasis on the possibility and means of conjunction with the Agent Intellect constitutes another thread of Averroes' doctrine, manifesting his staunch epistemic

optimism in the face of widespread concern for the primacy of Scripture vis-à-vis philosophy. This, finally, explains the peculiar universalism of Averroes' mind, whereby rational evidence transcends the boundaries of all religions and, though embodied primarily in the Qurʾān, ought to serve as a foundation not merely for the Muslim umma, but indeed for all faiths and nations, fulfilled by Islam itself much as Islam is fulfilled by philosophy.